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Comments 
Algorithms & Instruments: The Effective 
Elimination of New Jersey’s Cash Bail 
System and Its Replacement 
David J. Reimel III* 
ABSTRACT 
 
“In the American criminal justice system, wealth—not culpability—
shapes outcomes” 
– The Equal Justice Initiative. 
Until 2017, every state conditioned pretrial release on cash bail. 
Judges across the United States predicted the risk individuals posed of 
failing to appear and the danger to the community. As a result, indigent 
individuals waited in jails merely because they could not afford their bail. 
In 2017, New Jersey spearheaded the movement to change how the bail 
system operates by passing the Criminal Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”), 
which created an objective decision-making tool called the Public Safety 
Assessment.  
 Today, New Jersey judges are no longer required to speculate about 
the future decisions of individual defendants. Instead, the Public Safety 
 
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020. I would 
like to thank my wife, Karly Reimel, for her support throughout writing this Comment, 
and, my parents, for the examples they set in their academic careers. I would also like to 
thank my colleagues at the Penn State Law Review for their advice and support throughout 
the Comment-writing process. 
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Assessment provides a tool for judges throughout the state to uniformly 
assess the risks based on statistical data. The CJRA uses algorithms and 
statistical calculations, from which judges use a Decision-Making 
Framework to determine whether bond is appropriate and the terms and 
conditions of that bond. The CJRA has virtually eliminated monetary bond 
entirely.  
 Two years later, in 2019, both New Jersey’s pretrial jail population 
and crime rate have decreased. Furthermore, judges can rely on analytics 
that remove the guesswork from bail decisions. Most importantly, no one 
in the state of New Jersey is incarcerated prior to trial for the sole reason 
of indigency. 
 This Comment will recommend that states abandon a 
predominantly cash bail framework and use New Jersey’s risk assessment 
tool. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that adopting New Jersey’s 
framework will decrease the pretrial jail population, decrease the crime 
rate, and ensure that no individual is incarcerated prior to trial for the sole 
reason they are indigent. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 2017, the New Jersey Constitution guaranteed “[a]ll 
persons . . . before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offenses when the proof is evident or [the] presumption great.”1 
Recently, following the enactment of the Criminal Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA), the “sufficient sureties” language was removed and replaced by 
a bail system that de-emphasized cash bail.2 Presently, all individuals 
charged with a crime in New Jersey can be released from prison without 
providing the “sufficient sureties” formerly required under the cash bail 
system.3 
The cash bail system directly impacted Mustafa Willis  (Mr. Willis), 
one of many individuals who called for cash bail reform in New Jersey.4 
Mr. Willis was 24-years-old when he was arrested in 2010 for unlawful 
possession of a firearm.5 The judge set Mr. Willis’s bond at $50,000.6 
Given the high price, Mr. Willis’s family could not afford to pay his bond 
outright.7 Mr. Willis could not even afford to pay 10% ($5,000) of that 
amount to a bail bondsman8 to be released.9 Unexpectedly, Mr. Willis 
learned that there was a surveillance video showing a police officer 
planting the firearm that ultimately landed him within the criminal justice 
system..10 However, Mr. Willis was unable to obtain the tape to confirm 
his innocence because he was incarcerated.11 Four months later, the judge 
adjusted Mr. Willis’s bond amount to $30,000.12 After the adjustment, Mr. 
Willis’s family was able to scrape together enough cash to pay the 
bondsman.13 After Mr. Willis posted bail, he was able to obtain the 
surveillance video that confirmed his innocence.14 
By the time Mr. Willis earned his freedom, the damage had already 
been done. In Mr. Willis’s case, he had lost his job due to his arrest, and 
 
1. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2014). 
2. See id. 
3. See id. 
4. See Jon Schuppe, Post Bail, NBC.COM (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://nbcnews.to/2wzB7mM. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See Crystal Ignatowski, What is a Bail Bond & How Do They Work?, 
SURETYSOLUTIONS.COM, https://bit.ly/2ZzAaWR (last visited Jan. 16, 2019) (explaining 
how bail bonds work in a cash bail system). 
9. See Schuppe, supra note 4. 
10. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
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therefore, repaying the bondsman proved nearly impossible.15 Moreover, 
after Mr. Willis’s arrest and release from jail, he struggled to find work, 
which added to the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining a source of 
income.16 Mr. Willis ultimately sued the Newark Police Department and 
his case settled for $6,000.17 Most of the settlement money, however, was 
used to repay his family, after being charged for a crime he did not 
commit.18  
In 2013, the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) conducted a study in an 
effort to analyze the problems that individuals like Mr. Willis faced with 
cash bail in New Jersey.19 The study illustrated, on a mass scale, the 
number of individuals incarcerated while awaiting trial.20 Following the 
study’s release, Governor Chris Christie urged the legislature to enact a 
bail reform bill in New Jersey.21 One year later, the New Jersey legislature 
passed the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) with bipartisan support.22 
Around the same time, New Jersey also elected to amend the New Jersey 
Constitution23 to reflect the missions and goals of the CJRA.24  
In passing the CJRA, the goal of the New Jersey legislature was 
three-fold: (1) assure the defendant appeared in court; (2) protect the 
citizens in the general population; and (3) prevent the “obstruction of 
justice by persons awaiting trial.”25 To accomplish these goals, the CJRA 
required the selection of a Risk Assessment Instrument,26 which would 
uniformly assess all defendants and express those assessments in an easily 
 
15. See id. 
16. See Id. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See Winning Bail Reform in New Jersey, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, 
https://bit.ly/2Mll5Tr (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
20. See Marie VanNostrand, New Jersey Jail Population Analysis: Identifying 
Opportunities to Safely and Responsibly Reduce the Jail Population, LUMINOSITY 13 (Mar. 
2013), https://bit.ly/2sDT0Oe. 
21. See Michael Aron, Christie Signs Bail Reform Bill, NJTV NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014, 
5:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2VZaqCa. 
22. Id. 
23. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended). 
24. See generally N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11. Prior to the amendment, N.J. CONST. art. 1 
§ 11 stated: “All persons . . . before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except 
for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great[.]” N.J. CONST. art. I, 
§ 11 (amended 2014). This language meant that any person charged with a non-capital 
crime could not be detained without bail. See also New Jersey Pretrial Detention 
Amendment, Public Question No. 1 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2U5NcIY (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2018). The amendment allows pretrial detainment without cash bail. 
25. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716 (D.N.J. 2017). 
26. A Risk Assessment Instrument is a tool used to “help judicial officers make 
informed decisions on who to release and who to detain” in the context of criminal law. 
John Etienne Myburgh et al., Review of Pretrial Risk Assessment and Factors Predicting 
Pretrial Release Failure, CTR. FORENSIC BEHAV. SCI. & JUST. STUD. 1, 19 (2015), 
https://bit.ly/2mtqqj6. 
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digestible format for the courts.27 The Risk Assessment Instrument that the 
New Jersey Courts adopted was the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).28  
The PSA analyzes three separate scores: (1) the Failure to Appear 
(FTA) score; (2) the New Criminal Activity (NCA) score; and the (3) New 
Violent Criminal Activity (NVCA) flag.29 These scores are then analyzed 
by the courts to determine if, and on what terms, a defendant may be 
released during pretrial proceedings.30 
Despite the CJRA, opponents of bail reform remain skeptical.31 For 
example, June Rodgers (Ms. Rodgers) “blamed bail reform for the murder 
of her son.”32 Ms. Rodgers’s son was shot and killed following a “verbal 
dispute with a man in a car.”33 Police officers arrested the man in the car, 
who had been arrested four days earlier and subsequently released with no 
cash bail.34 Without bail reform, the man who shot Ms. Rodgers’s son may 
not have been released from jail due to his prior arrest. Despite such 
terrible incidents, many have celebrated the CJRA because indigent 
individuals are not incarcerated merely because they cannot afford cash 
bail.35  
New Jersey is the first state to effectively eliminate cash bail and 
create a Risk Assessment Tool to calculate a defendant’s likelihood to 
appear, likelihood to commit a crime, and likelihood to commit a violent 
crime.36 This Comment will analyze whether states should adopt similar 
bail reform.37 
Part II of this Comment will discuss New Jersey’s prior cash bail 
system,38 the goals of the CJRA, and how the PSA accomplishes these 
goals.39 Part II will also discuss the three components of the PSA-including 
the Failure to Appear score, the New Criminal Activity score, and the New 
 
27. Id. 
28. The Public Safety Assessment is an administrative tool designed to predict the 
likelihood that a defendant will or will not (1) appear in subsequent court appearances and 
(2) be a danger to the community, if released. See Public Safety Assessment: A Risk Tool 
That Promotes Safety, Equity, and Justice, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://bit.ly/2zdn4ni [hereinafter Public Safety Assessment]. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See Sarah Wallace, ‘Nobody’s Afraid to Commit Crimes’: Cops, Victims Blast 
Overhaul of NJ Bail System, NBC N.Y. (May 18, 2017, 9:38 PM), https://bit.ly/2T4yPEx.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. 
35. See Lessons for the Nation: New Jersey’s Cash Bail Overhaul (Brave New Films 
2017), https://bit.ly/2TalevH. 
36. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
37. See infra Part III.  
38. See infra Section II.A. This Comment will not give an in depth analysis of cash 
bail generally, as states widely differ in its application. 
39. See infra Section II.B. 
CMT 1 - ALGORITHMS & INSTRUMENTS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2019  4:40 PM 
198 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1 
Violent Criminal Activity flag. Finally, Part II will analyze how judges 
use the PSA within the Decision-Making Framework (DMF)40 and the 
ways in which the law allows prosecutors and judges to bypass the 
Decision-Making Framework in certain instances.41  
Next, Part III will analyze the impact of bail reform on New Jersey’s 
pretrial jail population and crime rates.42 Part III of this Comment will also 
emphasize the importance of re-evaluating the static risk factors of the 
PSA every three to five years to account for unique crimes and new 
empirical studies.43 Then, Part IV will recommend that all states adopt bail 
reform similar to New Jersey’s model.44 Last, Part V will provide 
concluding remarks on the issues addressed throughout this Comment.45 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Upon arrest and commitment to a county jail, a defendant in New 
Jersey is required by statute to appear before a judge within 48 hours.46 
During this first appearance, the judge sets conditions for pretrial release 
pending trial.47 Before the CJRA was implemented in 2017, the condition 
for pretrial release was “sufficient sureties,” commonly known today as 
cash bail.48  
Under the previous cash bail system, defendants could post bail in 
several ways. If defendants had the required funds available, then they 
could simply pay the court.49 When defendants did not have the funds,  
they had to rely on family and friends or find a bail bondsman.50 A bail 
bondsman would agree to pay the cash bail required, but then charge 
defendants a fee, which was usually a percentage of the bond.51 If 
defendants could not afford to pay a bail bondsman a percentage of the fee 
 
40. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra Section II.D.  
42. See infra Sections III.A., III.B.  
43. See infra Section III.C. 
44. See infra Part IV. 
45. See infra Part V. 
46. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(b)(1) (West 2017). 
47. See id. 
48. See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2014). 
49. See How Do Bail Bonds Work?, SPEEDYBAILBONDS, https://bit.ly/2TXPt8S (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. The percentage of the fee is usually 10% of the total cash bond owed to the 
court. See Ignatowski, supra note 8. The rest of the cash bond will be secured by the bail 
bondsman in the form of collateral, such as a car or jewelry. After the case concludes, so 
long as the defendant has arrived at all court proceedings, the bond is released, and the bail 
bondsman recoups the fee originally obtained from the bond release. If the defendant does 
not arrive at all court proceedings then the bond is forfeited and the bail bondsman will use 
the collateral obtained to recoup the rest of the bail amount. Id. 
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or find another means to pay the cash bond, then defendants were required 
to stay in jail pending trial.52  
In 2014, however, the New Jersey legislature proposed a significant 
change to the cash bond process with the CJRA—a new system without a 
cash bail requirement and instead analyzes a defendant’s criminal history 
to determine whether a defendant should be released.53 
A.    New Jersey’s 2014 CJRA  
In 2013, the Drug Policy Alliance54 released a study addressing the 
demographics of individuals incarcerated for drug use in New Jersey.55 
The study showed that on any given day in 2012, approximately 13,003 
inmates were detained in county jails throughout New Jersey.56 Of the 
13,003 inmates, approximately 9,492 were detained because they were 
either awaiting sentencing or trial; approximately 5,006 inmates were in 
custody because they could not afford bail; approximately 1,560 inmates 
were in pretrial custody because they could not afford bail set at $2,500 or 
less; and approximately 800 inmates could not afford to post bail for 
approximately $500 or less.57  
Given these statistics, the study concluded that the “greatest 
opportunities to responsibly reduce New Jersey’s jail population are 
related to more efficiently and effectively managing the pretrial 
population.”58 Shortly after the study’s release, the New Jersey legislature 
took steps to reform bail.59 
Following the study’s release, Governor Chris Christie urged 
lawmakers to reform New Jersey’s “broken” bail system.60 Governor 
Christie wanted voters to decide on a state constitutional amendment that 
would allow “judges to deny bail to offenders who pose a threat to safety, 
a flight risk, or could obstruct justice.”61 Then, in August of 2014, 
 
52. See Robert Greenwald, What Happens if You’re Too Poor to Pay Bail?, THE 
NATION (Mar. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2FHhSx9. 
53. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16 (West 2017). 
54. The Drug Policy Alliance “envisions a just society in which the use and regulation 
of drugs are grounded in science, compassion, health and human rights, in which the people 
are no longer punished for what they put into their own bodies but only for crimes 
committed against others.” Vision & Mission, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, 
https://bit.ly/2Doa3de (last visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
55. See VanNostrand, supra note 20, at 13. 
56. See id. at 8. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 715 (D.N.J. 2017). 
60. See Aron, supra note 21 (clarifying that “[t]hree quarters of the people . . . being 
warehoused in our jails were there awaiting trial rather than serving a sentence and their 
average length of stay is about [ten] months”). 
61. Id. 
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Governor Christie signed the CJRA into law.62 Three months later, the 
people of New Jersey voted to amend the New Jersey Constitution to 
remove the requirement of “sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses 
when the proof is evident or presumption great.”63 In January of 2017, the 
CJRA was enacted into law.64  
B.   The Goals of the CJRA and How it Changed Pretrial Procedure 
The CJRA seeks to endorse three separate goals in consideration of a 
defendant’s pretrial release: (1) assure the defendant appears in court; (2) 
protect the citizens in the general population; and (3) prevent the 
“obstruction of justice by persons awaiting trial.”65 To accomplish these 
goals, the CJRA modified New Jersey’s criminal justice system to permit 
judges to order pretrial detention for defendants if there is “clear and 
convincing evidence that no condition [of release] or combination of 
conditions [of release] can reasonably assure” the goals of the CJRA.66 
The CJRA also moved New Jersey from a cash bail system that was 
“resource-based”67  to a bail system that “relies upon an objective 
evaluation of an individual defendant’s level of risk.”68 
 
62. See id. 
63. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2014). The amended Constitution states:  
All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release. Pretrial 
release may be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of monetary 
bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary 
bail and non-monetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s 
appearance in court when required, or protect the safety of any other person or 
the community, or prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct 
the criminal justice process. 
Id. 
64. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15 (West 2017). 
65. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716 (D.N.J. 2017); see also N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:162–15. The statute states: 
[The CJRA] shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of primarily 
relying upon pretrial release by non-monetary means to reasonably assure an 
eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the 
safety of any other person or the community, that the eligible defendant will not 
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, and that the eligible 
defendant will comply with all conditions of release. 
Id. 
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15,—18(a)(1). Clear and convincing evidence is 
“[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” 
See also Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
67. A resource-based cash bail system is one that relies on a defendant’s own 
financial resources to post cash bail. See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 716. 
68. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17. 
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Under the CJRA, an “eligible defendant,”69 upon arrest, is detained 
for no more than 48 hours.70  Within those 48 hours, a Pretrial Services71 
Program (Pretrial Services) completes a risk assessment analysis, 
including “recommendations on conditions of release.”72 After the risk 
assessment analysis is complete, Pretrial Services makes a 
recommendation to the judge, and the judge then determines whether the 
defendant will remain detained or be released from jail pending trial.73 The 
judge is required to make this “pretrial release decision” within 48 hours 
of incarceration.74 
The CJRA permits the presiding judge to choose between five 
conditions for pretrial release: (1) release on one’s own recognizance75 
(ROR); (2) release by use of non-monetary conditions;76 (3) release by 
cash bail;77 (4) release by a combination of monetary bail and non-
monetary conditions; and (5) detain in jail pending trial.78  
The first option, an ROR, is the least restrictive means of 
enforcement.79 ROR means a defendant is released without specific 
conditions to ensure the defendant returns to court.80 On the other end of 
the spectrum, the fifth option, detaining a defendant in jail until trial, is the 
most restrictive.81 To determine which of the five options to apply, the 
judge analyzes an objective Risk Assessment Instrument, which uses 
 
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15 (“A person for whom a complaint-warrant is 
issued for an initial charge involving an indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense 
unless otherwise provided in [the CJRA].”). 
70. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17. 
71. Pretrial services is defined as “[a]n investigation of a . . . criminal defendant’s 
background, conducted after the defendant has been arrested and charged but before trial, 
to help the court determine whether to release or detain the defendant pending trial.” 
Pretrial Services, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
72. Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 717. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Release on Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The 
pretrial release of an arrested person who promises . . . in writing but without supplying a 
surety or posting bond, to appear for trial at a later date.”). 
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17(b)(2) (Non-monetary conditions include 
“remain[ing] in the custody of a designated person,” “maintain[ing] employment . . . or 
actively seek[ing] employment,” “abiding by . . . place of abode,” “report[ing] on a regular 
basis to a designated law enforcement agency,” “comply[ing] with a specified curfew,” 
“refrain[ing] from possessing a firearm,” “refrain[ing] from excessive use of alcohol,” or 
“return[ing] to custody for specified hours following release for employment”).  
77. In 2017, only forty-four defendants were required to post cash bail as a condition 
for release. See Criminal Justice Reform Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. 
JUDICIARY 4 (2017), https://bit.ly/2PxUIdB [hereinafter Criminal Justice Reform Report]. 
78. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(b)(2). 
79. See id. 
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
81. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16. A judge can only make a determination of 
pretrial detention if the prosecutor has made a motion for pretrial detention.  
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statistics to predict the future behaviors of defendants if granted pretrial 
release.82 In New Jersey, the chosen Risk Assessment Instrument is the 
PSA.83 
C.    New Jersey’s Risk Assessment Instrument: The PSA 
The PSA84 embodies the policy goals of the CJRA.85 The PSA 
assesses three factors: (1) a Failure to Appear score (FTA score); (2) a 
New Criminal Activity (NCA) score; and (3) a New Violent Criminal 
Activity (NCVA) flag.86 
1.      The FTA Score 
The FTA score is calculated by measuring a variety of static risk 
factors87 that determine the likelihood that a defendant will appear at court 
proceedings prior to trial.88 A raw score is calculated from these static 
factors and then transferred to a six-point scale.89 If the defendant has a 
pending charge at the time of the offense, the defendant receives one 
point.90 If the defendant has a prior conviction, the defendant receives one 
point.91 If the defendant has failed to appear at a pretrial hearing within the 
past two years, the defendant receives one point.92 If the defendant has 
failed to appear two or more times within the past two years, however, the 
defendant receives four points.93 Finally, if the defendant has a prior 
failure to appear to a pretrial hearing older than two years, the defendant 
receives one point.94 
 
82. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(a). 
83. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
84. The Public Safety Assessment was approved by the Administrative Director of 
the New Jersey courts under the CJRA. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—25(c)(1) (West 
2017). 
85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—15. 
86. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. An FTA score analyzes the 
likelihood that a defendant will appear in court at all pretrial proceedings. See id. An NCA 
score analyzes the likelihood a defendant will commit additional crimes while awaiting 
trial. See id. An NVCA Flag will alert the judge if the defendant is more likely to commit 
a violent offense while awaiting trial. See id.  
87. “Static risk factors are features of the [defendants’] histories that predict 
recidivism but are not amenable to deliberate intervention, such as prior offences.” 
Research Summary, Giving Meaning to Risk Factors, 15 PUB. SAFETY CAN. 1, 1 (Nov. 
2010), available at https://bit.ly/2P1ArS6. 
88. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
89. See id. Every factor calculated in the assessment is a static factor.  
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
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Once the static risk factors are evaluated, the points are added 
together to create a raw score.95 The raw score is then converted to a six-
point scale.96 The raw scores of 0, 1, 2, 3—4, 5—6, and 7 convert to a 
scaled FTA score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively.97 A defendant with a 
raw score of six is considered the least likely to appear at a pretrial hearing, 
while a defendant with a raw score of one is considered the most likely to 
appear at a pretrial hearing.98 In addition to the FTA score, the PSA also 
calculates the NCA score.  
2.      The NCA Score  
The NCA score is calculated by measuring a variety of static factors 
that determine the likelihood that a defendant will commit a crime while 
on pretrial release.99 Similar to the FTA score, the NCA score is a raw 
score calculated from static risk factors and then transferred to a six-point 
scale.100  
If the defendant is under the age of 23, the defendant receives two 
points; if the defendant is over the age of 23, the defendant receives zero 
points.101 If the defendant has a pending charge at the time of the offense, 
the defendant receives three points.102 If the defendant has a prior 
misdemeanor conviction, the defendant receives one point.103 
Furthermore, if the defendant has a prior felony conviction, the defendant 
receives one point.104 If the defendant has one or two prior violent 
convictions,105 the defendant receives two points.106 However, if the 
defendant has three or more prior violent convictions, the defendant 
 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
98. Id. There is a 16% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 1. 
N.J. PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL 8 (Dec. 2016), https://bit.ly/2SqiuxQ [hereinafter Pretrial 
Justice Manual]. There is a 19% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score 
of 2. Id. There is 25% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 3. Id. 
There is 37% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 4. Id. There is a 
53% chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 5. Id. Last, there is a 65% 
chance a defendant will fail to appear with an FTA score of 6. Id. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. “‘Violent Crime’ means any crime in which the actor causes death, causes 
serious bodily injury [] defined by statute, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
deadly weapon. [It] also includes any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which 
the actor uses, or threatens . . . immediate . . . physical force.” State v. Parolin, 793 A.2d 
638, 642 (N.J. 2002); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11—1 (West 2017). 
106. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
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receives two points.107 If the defendant missed a court proceeding one time 
within the past two years, then one point is added to the raw score.108 
However, if the defendant failed to appear for a court proceeding more 
than once within the past two years, then two points are added to the raw 
score.109 Last, if the defendant has a prior sentence of incarceration, the 
defendant receives two points.110 
Similar to the FTA score, the raw NCA score is converted to a six-
point scale with a six considered to be the most likely to commit a crime 
while on release and a one considered to be the least likely to commit a 
crime while on release.111 The raw scores of 0, 1—2, 3—4, 5—6, 7—8, 
and 9—13 correlate to a scaled NCA score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, 
respectively.112 After the NCA score is calculated, Pretrial Services must 
screen defendants to flag for new violent criminal activity.  
3.      The NVCA Flag 
Unlike the FTA and NCA scores, the NVCA flag is based on many 
static factors, but the raw score for the NVCA flag is not converted to a 
six-point scale.113 Rather, the NVCA flag becomes either a “flag” or “no 
flag” designation.114 The NVCA flag cautions judges against allowing a 
defendant’s release without strict conditions.115 Under the CJRA, a 
defendant with an NVCA flag has a much lower likelihood of receiving a 
pretrial release given the severity of crimes that are deemed “violent.”116 
The static factors used to develop a raw score for an NVCA flag are: 
(1) whether the defendant has a current violent offense; (2) whether the 
defendant has a current violent offense and is under the age of 21; (3) 
whether the defendant has a pending charge at the time of the offense; (4) 
 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. There is a 14% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release 
with an NCA score of 1. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 9. There is a 25% 
chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release with an NCA score of 2. Id. There 
is a 31% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release with an NCA score of 
3. Id. There is a 38% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on release with an 
NCA score of 4. Id. There is a 46% chance a defendant will commit a crime while on 
release with an NCA score of 5. Id. There is a 50% chance a defendant will commit a crime 
while on release with an NCA score of 6. Id. 
113. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
114. Id. 
115. See Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 719 (D.N.J. 2017). 
116. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43—7.2 (West 2017). 
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whether the defendant has a prior conviction; and (5) whether the 
defendant has a prior violent conviction.117  
Unlike the FTA and NCA scores, the raw NVCA score simply is 
converted to a “yes” or “no” designation as to whether an NVCA flag is 
applied.118 If an NVCA flag is applied to a defendant, judges are less likely 
to grant release.119 Raw scores of 0—3 convert to a “no,” which means an 
NVCA flag is not applied.120 Raw scores of 4—7 convert to a “yes,” which 
means an NVCA flag is applied.121 Whether a defendant receives a raw 
score of seven, the highest possible raw score, or four, the lowest possible 
raw score, is irrelevant because a judge cannot consider the score 
underlying the NVCA flag.122 
Moreover, age can play a prominent factor in determining whether a 
defendant receives an NVCA flag. For example, a defendant under the age 
of 21 with a violent offense and a pending charge at the time of the offense 
will automatically receive an NVCA flag under the PSA.123 By contrast, a 
22-year-old defendant in the same situation will not receive an NVCA flag 
at all.124 As such, two individuals one year apart in age charged with the 
same crime can receive vastly different pretrial release determinations 
because the NVCA “flags [younger] defendants as posing an elevated risk 
of [n]ew [v]iolent [c]riminal [a]ctivity . . . during the pretrial release 
period.”125 After the FTA, NCA, and NCVA have been calculated, the 
scores are analyzed under a decision-making framework (DMF).126 
D.    The Decision-Making Framework 
The DMF takes the three PSA scores and provides a uniform 
recommendation for release conditions.127 The DMF can be broken down 
 
117. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. If a defendant has a (1) current 
violent offense, then two points are added to the NVCA raw score. Id. If a defendant has a 
(2) violent offense and is under the age of 21, then one point is added to the NVCA raw 
score. Id. If a defendant has a (3) pending charge at the time of the offense, then one point 
is added to the raw score. Id. If the defendant has a (3) prior conviction, then one point is 
added to the raw score. Id. Finally, if a defendant has (4) one or two violent conviction, 
then one point is added, however, two points are added if a defendant has three or more 
violent convictions. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 10. 
120. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 9. 
126. The Decision-Making Framework (DMF) “produces a recommendation for a 
judge about conditions of release or detention.” Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 
10. 
127. Id. 
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into four separate phases.128 First, Pretrial Services calculates the PSA 
scores and recommends to the judge particular conditions the defendant 
should face while awaiting trial.129 The agency can recommend that the 
defendant be either ROR130 without any conditions or not ROR.131 If 
Pretrial Services recommends the defendant  not be ROR, then the agency 
can recommend release based on special conditions in a tiered format: 
“PML 1”; “PML 2”; “PML 3”; “PML 3+”; and “detained.”132 
PML 1 is the least restrictive tier and only requires that the defendant 
“report to a pretrial services officer by phone once per month.”133 PML 2 
is slightly more restrictive and requires a defendant to “report to a pretrial 
services officer once a month in person, once a month by telephone, and 
be subject to monitored conditions such as a curfew.”134 PML 3 is 
relatively restrictive and requires that a “defendant [be] monitored in-
person or by phone every week, and [be] subject to additional monitored 
conditions.”135 PML 3+ requires the defendant to be subject to all of the 
conditions described in PML 1, PML 2, and PML 3, plus it requires a GPS 
monitoring device and home confinement.136 The agency can also 
recommend that the defendant not be released at all.137 
Regardless of the PSA’s tiered matrix, the court can determine on its 
own whether charges are so serious that “release [is] not recommended; if 
released[, the defendant should receive] maximum conditions,” 
irrespective of the PSA and Pretrial Services recommendations.138 A court 
can disregard the PSA recommendation for the most serious charges, 
which include “murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual 
assault, and carjacking.”139 Furthermore, if the charged crime is considered 
“violent” and the defendant has an NVCA flag, then the court can decide 
to incarcerate the defendant until trial, irrespective of the PSA.140 
Next, the court applies the FTA and NCA scores to a DMF matrix.141 
An ROR order is recommended if the FTA and NCA scores are either 1 or 
 
128. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 719 (D.N.J. 2017). 
129. Id. 
130. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—17(b)(2). 
131. See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 719. 
132. See id. “PML” stands for “Pretrial Monitoring Levels.” See Pretrial Justice 
Manual, supra note 98, at 10. 
133. See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 719. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. PML 3+ means “Electronic Monitoring” or “Home Detention.” 
137. Id. 
138. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 10. 
139. Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 719. 
140. Id. 
141. See Pretrial Justice Manual, supra note 98, at 10. 
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2.142 A PML 1 order is recommended with an FTA score of 2 and an NCA 
score of 3.143 A PML 1 order is also recommended if the FTA score is 3 or 
4 and the NCA score is 2 or 3.144 A PML 2 order is recommended if the 
FTA score is 5, but the NCA score is 2 or 3.145 A PML 3 order is 
recommended if the FTA score is 5 and the NCA score is 4.146 A PML 3 
order is also recommended if the FTA score is either 2, 3, or 4, but the 
NCA score is 5.147 A PML 3+ order is recommended if both the FTA score 
and NCA score are 5.148 Last, release is not recommended if both the FTA 
and NCA scores are 6.149 
Fourth, the court determines whether the defendant was charged with 
a No Early Release Act (NERA) crime not addressed in the above crimes 
that recommend no release regardless of the PSA.150 If the defendant was 
charged with a NERA crime, then the recommended release conditions 
increase by one level.151 
After Pretrial Risk Services applies the PSA scores to the DMF 
matrix, they make a recommendation for the judge to consider during the 
preliminary hearing.152 The CJRA, however, has allowed room for the 
courts to address individualized circumstances of individual defendants 
irrespective of the PSA when considering pretrial release for defendants.153  
E.    The CJRA Addresses Potential Problems with the PSA 
Before a New Jersey court will order pretrial detention, a prosecutor 
must first apply for the detention.154 Next, the government must prove 
 
142. See id. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. See id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43—7.2 (West 2017). 
151. NERA crimes include: 
[1] vehicular homicide; . . . [2] aggravated assault; . . . [3] disarming a law 
enforcement officer; . . . [4] kidnapping; . . . [5] robbery; . . . [6] aggravated 
arson; . . . [7] burglary; . . . [8] extortion; . . . [9] booby traps in manufacturing 
or distribution facilities; . . . [10] strict liability for drug infused deaths; . . . [11] 
terrorism; . . . [12] producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents 
or nuclear or radiological devices; . . . [13] racketeering, when it is a crime of the 
first degree; . . . [14] firearms trafficking; or . . . [15] causing or permitting a 
child to engage in a prohibited sexual act, knowing that the act may be 
reproduced in any manner, or be part of an exhibition or performance. 
§ 2C:43—7.2. 
152. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—16(a). 
153. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—19. 
154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—19 (West 2017) (indicating that the prosecutor may 
only apply for detention if the specific crime is eligible for pretrial detention). 
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“that the eligible defendant committed the predicate offense” at a pretrial 
detention hearing.155 The defendant must be present at the hearing and 
must be represented by counsel.156 If the defendant is indigent, then 
counsel must be appointed. 157 At the preliminary hearing the defendant 
has the right to “testify, present witnesses, cross-examine any of the 
prosecutor’s witnesses, and present information by proffer.”158 After 
hearing the evidence presented, the court may only order pretrial 
detainment if it finds by “clear and convincing evidence that no amount of 
monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release[,] or [a] 
combination of money bail and conditions” adequately ensures public 
safety, prevents obstruction of justice, or the defendant’s appearance in 
court.159 
When a court detains a defendant after a pretrial detention hearing, 
the judge must “include written findings of fact and a written statement of 
the reasons for detention.”160 By contrast, when a court orders a 
defendant’s release following a pretrial detention hearing, the judge must 
“provide an explanation in the document that authorizes the eligible 
defendant’s release.”161 A defendant can appeal a pretrial detention ruling, 
which must be “heard in an expedited manner.”162 
Finally, if there has been a “material change in circumstance that 
justifies a change in conditions,” the Superior Court of New Jersey may, 
on its own motion or by a motion from either party, “review the conditions 
of pretrial release.”163 
The CJRA has successfully transitioned to a risk-based system 
through implementing the PSA and the DMF. New Jersey’s bail reform 
 
155. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—19(e)(2). 
156. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–19(e)(1). 
157. Id. 
158. Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 720 (D.N.J. 2017); see also N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:162–19(e)(1). 
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–18, –19(e)(1). The statute also states: 
The court may take into account information concerning . . . a. [t]he nature and 
circumstances of the offense charged; b. [t]he weight of the evidence against the 
eligible defendant, except that the court may consider the admissibility of any 
evidence sought to be excluded; c. [t]he history and characteristics of the eligible 
defendant . . . d. [t]he nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or 
the community that would be posed by the eligible defendant’s release, if 
applicable; e. [t]he nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting 
to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the eligible 
defendant’s release, if applicable; and f. [t]he release recommendation of the 
pretrial services program obtained using a risk assessment instrument. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162—2. 
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–21(1). 
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–23. 
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162–23(a)(2). 
163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:26–2(c)(2) (West 2017). 
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has been an effective model for other states because the CJRA adequately 
balances risk and contains measures for independent judicial decision-
making to handle potential flaws with the PSA.164 Additionally, two years 
following the enactment of the CJRA, the pretrial jail population has 
significantly dropped along with an unprecedented drop in crime.165 
III.  ANALYSIS 
As New Jersey leads the nation in bail reform through legislation 
enacted in 2017, many states are following suit.166 For example, in 2018 
Alaska enacted similar bail reforms and established a quantitative 
algorithm to make bail decisions.167 Additionally, the California Supreme 
Court declared cash bail as unconstitutional in 2018.168 Given recent state 
trends, Risk Assessment Instruments such as the PSA should serve as the 
model for bail reform in other states.169 
Following the first full year of bail reform, “New Jersey has become 
a national leader in [bail] reform.”170 Defendants no longer wait in jail 
pending trial solely because they cannot afford cash bail. The CJRA has 
successfully reduced the crime rate as the PSA ensures that defendants at 
risk of endangering the public stay incarcerated while allowing less 
dangerous defendants to return to the general population.171 
Given the success of the CJRA in New Jersey, state legislatures 
should enact bail reform and use New Jersey as a model. Adopting New 
Jersey’s PSA would (1) reduce the pretrial jail population and (2) reduce 
the crime rate.172 Despite initial success, however, static factors used by 
states as a basis for algorithms, such as the PSA, should be periodically re-
evaluated to ensure Risk Assessment Instruments continue to accomplish 
state goals.173  
 
164. See infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.  
165. See infra notes 171, 186 and accompanying text.  
166. See Alaska Becomes Latest State to Enact Bail Reform, EJI (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2Mlp823; see also Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State to End 
Cash Bail After 40 Year Fight, N.P.R. (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://n.pr/2FQYDjX. 
167. See Devin Kelly, Alaska courts are now using a computer algorithm in bail 
decisions, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2018), https://bit.ly/2FN28b2.  
168. See Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State to End Cash Bail After 40 
Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://n.pr/2FQYDjX. 
169. See generally Justin Jouvenal, Virginia Attorney General Calls for Reforming 
State’s Bond System, WASH. POST, (Oct. 21, 2018), https://wapo.st/2E2laZw. 
170. Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 3. 
171. See Rebecca Ibarra, Crime Rates Plunge in New Jersey, and Bail Reform 
Advocates Are Gloating, WNYC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RXe0NX. 
172. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
173. See infra Section III.C. 
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A. Adopting New Jersey’s PSA will Reduce the Pretrial Jail 
Population 
Between January 1, 2015, and January 1, 2018, “statistics show[ed] 
a reduction of the pretrial jail population [in New Jersey] by . . . 35%.”174 
This reduction can be attributed to the CJRA and its movement away from 
cash bail.175 Meeting cash bail requirements often takes significant time 
and can lead to sporadic results, such as creating undue pressure for 
defendants to plead guilty for the sole purpose of leaving jail.176 New 
Jersey’s system, however, has shown that 99.5% of defendants will know 
whether they will be released within 48 hours of incarceration.177 New 
Jersey’s streamlined process holds defendants who commit violent crimes 
but allows less dangerous defendants to await trial at home rather than in 
a jail cell.178 
1. Cash Bail Increases the Pretrial Jail Population 
Under the common bail system, after being arrested, the defendant 
must wait for a bail hearing to learn the amount of cash bail needed to be 
released and then find a means to pay.179 When defendants are unable to 
pay the cash bail amount many resort to desperation: such as “plead[ing] 
guilty in order to exit jail.”180 Indigent detainees face mounting daily 
pressures such as losing a job for failing to arrive at work, housing, and 
even custody of children when they cannot pay cash bail.181  
Especially in misdemeanor cases, pleading guilty often means that 
defendants can exit jail based on time served or probation.182 Simply put, 
financial pressures sometimes encourages innocent defendants to plead 
 
174. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4. 
175. Id. (“Considering the entire universe of 142,663 complaint-summons and 
complaint-warrants filed in 2017, and the 8,043 defendants actually detained, the rate of 
pretrial release is 94.2% and pretrial detention is actually 5.6% of all defendants issued 
complaints in 2017.”). 
176. See Scott Shackford, Garden State Crime is Down Since New Jersey Ditched 
Cash Bail, REASON (Dec. 6, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://bit.ly/2AXEm8O. 
177. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 13 (“[F]or eligible 
defendants for whom the prosecutor did not file a detention motion, courts made release 
decisions for 81.3% within 24 hours and 99.5% within 48 hours.”); see also Michael P. 
Jacobson & Reagan Daly, How To Release Jail Populations in Big Ways, 
GOVERNING.COM, https://bit.ly/2utxe0b (last visited Jan. 18, 2019) (Defendants “who 
spend even two days in pretrial detention are significantly more likely to recidivate after 
their cases are decided.”). 
178. See supra Section II.C. 
179. See Schuppe, supra note 4. 
180. See Shackford, supra note 176. 
181. See id. 
182. See PAUL HEATON ET AL., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017). 
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guilty when they otherwise would go to trial to prove their innocence.183 
Consequently, pretrial detention is “especially likely” to prompt wrongful 
guilty pleas.184 To avoid even the possibility of an innocent defendant 
pleading guilty, a streamlined pretrial process to evaluate defendants 
quickly and adequately ensures fair treatment of all defendants irrespective 
of wealth. The PSA has successfully accomplished this goal.185 
2. The PSA Decreases the Pretrial Jail Population 
Presently, 99.5% of all arrested individuals received pretrial 
detainment hearings within 48 hours of arrest.186 Upon arrest, Pretrial 
Services evaluates a defendant’s FTA and NCA scores and NVCA flag.187 
Pretrial Services then makes their pretrial recommendation and a hearing 
occurs within 24 to 48 hours, including weekends due to virtual courts.188 
With the creation of virtual courts, a defendant charged with a non-violent 
crime can be arrested on a Friday evening and be back with their family 
by Sunday.189 
Additionally, the PSA conforms to the United States’ presumption of 
innocence.190 The elimination of cash bail and a prompt pretrial release 
determination ensures that innocent defendants do not plead guilty for the 
sole purpose of returning home.191 Eliminating cash bail and instituting a 
more efficient pretrial release system also ensures that the defendants who 
are unlikely to commit additional crimes are released with certain 
conditions and reduces unnecessary costs of incarceration for taxpayers.192  
In New Jersey, indigent defendants are no longer in jail merely 
because they lack financial resources.193 Moreover, wealthy defendants no 
longer have the option to buy their way out of prison after committing 
murder.194 Currently, individuals “charged with felonies make up more 
 
183. See id. at 715. 
184. Id. at 716. 
185. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
186. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4. 
187. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
188. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4, 24; see also Keith B. 
Kaplan, Will Virtual Courts Create Courthouse Relics?, 52 No. 2 Judges’ J. 32, 32 
(2013) (“A virtual court is a conceptual idea of a judicial forum that has no physical 
presence but still provides the same justice services that are available in courthouses.”). 
189. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 24. 
190. See Ariana Tanoos, Shielding the Presumption of Innocence from Pretrial 
Media Coverage, 50 IND. L. REV. 997, 999 (2017) (“The presumption of innocence is 
derived from the ancient maxim that the accuser must prove the guilt of the accused 
before the accused can be punished.”). 
191. See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
192. See Shackford, supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
193. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 7. 
194. See id. 
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than two-thirds of the jail population nationwide.”195 Hence, 
approximately one-third of the prisoners are charged with 
misdemeanors.196 If all states follow New Jersey and adopt the PSA, then 
states can release these “minimal risk” misdemeanor defendants, which 
would result in a significant drop in the jail population nationwide.197 
B.    Adoption of New Jersey’s PSA Will Reduce the Crime Rate 
The most prominent critics of bail reform, the bail bonds industry,198 
argue that crimes would increase because the state would “unleash[] 
dangerous criminals back onto the streets.”199 But in the two years since 
the CJRA was enacted, the crime rate in New Jersey has “plummeted 
across the board.”200 In fact, “total violent crime [in New Jersey] is down 
more than 30%.”201 While this significant drop in crime may not be 
directly attributable to the CJRA, the static factors analyzed for the PSA 
keep violent, repeat offenders behind bars.202  
The CJRA addresses two factors that contribute to the decrease in the 
crime rate. First, defendants that commit violent crimes, from homicide to 
carjacking, are uniformly ineligible for release. Second, the NCA score 
and NVCA flag uniformly screen individuals who have prior criminal 
convictions and violent offenses.203 
The key to reducing crime is uniformity. The PSA applies the same 
factors to create an NCA score and NVCA flag the same way each time.204 
The judge determines on what grounds to release a defendant using the 
 
195. Jacobson & Daly, supra note 177. 
196. See id. 
197. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 7; see also supra notes 
195–96 and accompanying text.  
198. The CJRA is causing the bail bonds industry to go bankrupt due to the 
effective elimination of cash bail. See Michaelangelo Conte, Bail Reform is Killing Our 
Business, Bail Bondsmen Say, NJ.COM (Jan. 11, 2017), https://bit.ly/2sDXIvo. 
199. See NJ Bail Reform Survives on Federal Appeal, NORTHJERSEY.COM (July 11, 
2018, 4:03 P.M.), https://njersy.co/2usUtaF.  
200. Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Has Bail Reform Been A Success? Check the 
Crime Numbers, Then Decide, NJ.COM (Dec. 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RB38WN. 
201. See id. “State Police statistics show that compared to 2016 data (January to 
September), homicides are down 32% in the same period for 2018.” Id. Furthermore, 
rapes are down 13% in the same period for 2018; robberies are down 37% in the same 
period for 2018; assaults are down 18% in the same period for 2018; and burglaries are 
down 30% in the same period for 2018. See id.; see also DEP’T OF LAW AND PUB. SAFETY 
DIV. OF STATE POLICE, UNIF. CRIME REPORTING UNIT (2018). 
202. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
203. For example, a person who is charged with a violent offense, has a prior 
conviction and is under the age of 20 will receive an NVCA flag and is extremely likely 
to stay in jail pending trial. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
204. See supra Section II.C. 
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uniform DMF Matrix, which applies to every judge in the state.205 If the 
judge decides to release a defendant, then the prosecutor has the option to 
appeal.206  
Of the other states that use a predominantly cash bail system, 
however, no state currently applies risk factors to a decision-making 
framework similar to the PSA.207 Instead, a judge typically analyzes 
statutory factors that are not quantifiable to reach a decision on monetary 
bail.208 Pretrial Risk Services’ utilization of the PSA and DMF guarantees 
uniformity in its application towards all defendants.209  
Implementing the PSA will likely reduce the crime rate for all states 
while providing uniformity to judicial decision-making. The crime rate is 
down in New Jersey following the enactment of the CJRA which addresses 
whether a defendant will commit another crime while out on bail.210 
Judicial discretion in cash bail decision-making can be inherently much 
more inconsistent.211 Further, cash bail, unlike the PSA, is not backed by 
empirical data.212 Therefore, defendants awaiting pretrial release (or 
detention) in state courts will be assessed by their criminal history and risk 
level rather than the size of their wallets.  
C. States Should Evaluate Factors to Address Changes in 
Crime 
States that adopt bail reform similar to New Jersey’s system should 
regularly re-evaluate static risk factors in order to better evaluate 
individuals and crimes.213 Risk Assessment Instruments are relatively new 
tools used to predict a defendant’s likelihood to appear in court and risk of 
 
205. See supra Section II.D. 
206. See supra Section II.E. Of the “19,366 motions for pretrial detention . . . the 
court ordered 8,043 [of those] defendants detained.” See Criminal Justice Reform Report, 
supra note 77, at 4. 
207. See James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and 
Defining the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & Pol’y 637, 654–56 (2017) 
(“[Bail] procedural schemes are now executed in starkly different manners across states, 
and their varying results . . . have been criticized for possibly interfering . . . in assigning 
accurate bail amounts.”). 
208. See id. at 655. 
209. See supra Sections II.C., II.D. 
210. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
211. See John S. Goldcamp & Michael R. Gottfredson, Bail Decisionmaking and 
Pretrial Detention, L. & HUM. BEHAV., 3, 4 (1979) (“A finding of special significance is 
that a large proportion of [bail decisions] could not be explained systematically (i.e., a 
large share of variance remain[s] unexplained).”). 
212. See Allen, supra note 207, at 655. 
213. Factors such as “[t]he defendant’s physical condition . . . [f]amily ties . . . [and] 
[c]ommunity ties” have not been found to have a strong relationship with empirically 
validated risk factors. Myburgh et al., supra note 26, at 57. Therefore, those factors 
should not be considered. See id. 
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committing crimes while on release.214 Despite the Arnold Foundation’s215 
assembly of more than  “1.5 million cases from approximately 300 
jurisdictions across the United States,”216 the PSA solely uses static risk 
factors as opposed to dynamic risk factors.217 While it is premature to 
invoke dynamic risk factors in Risk Assessment Instruments like the PSA, 
future studies may change the way Risk Assessment Instruments use static 
and dynamic factors.218  
Static risk factors “are only moderately accurate in the prediction of 
future violence.”219 Dynamic risk factors, however, “are valuable 
predictors of recidivism . . . [and] they can serve as an important 
methodological function in identifying the causes of crime and 
reoffending.”220 
 Successful implementation of dynamic risk factors can improve the 
PSA in several ways. First, dynamic risk factors allow for a mechanism 
that does not entirely focus on a defendant’s criminal history.221 Second, 
dynamic risk factors may address issues that the PSA does not adequately 
address, such as predicting behavior associated with domestic violence.222 
The PSA focuses entirely on a defendant’s criminal history, which is 
only one of four empirically-supportive focus groups of predictive static 
factors.223 The four focus groups of static factors include: (1) individual 
factors, such as age, gender, ethnicity, substance abuse, and mental health 
status; (2) economic factors, such as education level, employment status, 
and financial resources; (3) social factors, such as residential stability, 
marital status, and availability of guarantors; and (4) criminal factors, such 
as criminal history, past release failures and current criminal 
 
214. The PSA was created in 2013. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
215. The Arnold Foundation is a philanthropy which focuses on criminal justice 
reform in areas such as policing, pretrial justice, community supervision, prisons, and re-
integration of prisoners. Criminal Justice, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://bit.ly/2G60Gk6 
(last visited June 23, 2019). 
216. See Public Safety Assessment, supra note 28. 
217. Dynamic risk factors are factors that change based on changing lifetime 
circumstances. See J.W. Coid et al., Improving Risk Management for Violence in Mental 
Health Services: A Multimethods Approach, 4 PROGRAMME GRANTS FOR APPLIED RES., 
Nov. 2016, at 1, 255. Examples of dynamic risk factors are homelessness and eviction. 
See id. at 256. 
218. See id. at 255. (“Further investigation is . . . needed into the relationship 
between static and dynamic risk for future intervention.”). 
219. See id. 
220. Tony Ward & Clare-Anne Fortune, The Role of Dynamic Risk Factors in the 
Explanation of Offending, 29 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV., July–Aug. 2016, at 79, 79 
(emphasis omitted). 
221. See infra text accompanying notes 223–26. 
222. See infra text accompanying notes 227–30. 
223. See Myburgh et al., supra note 26, at iv; see also Public Safety Assessment, 
supra note 28. 
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involvement.224 The PSA does not include individual factors other than 
age and completely ignores economic factors and social factors.225 Unlike 
static factors, dynamic factors may address individual circumstances aside 
from character traits to predict the likelihood of appearance and the 
likelihood of violence.226 
The PSA also fails to address specific issues of domestic violence.227 
Some of these issues include “show[ing] signs of escalating violence, 
changes in behavior, and whether they have a history of weapon use.”228 
Interestingly, dynamic factors may better evaluate signs of escalating 
violence and changes in behavior associated with domestic violence.229 
Specifically, dynamic factors such as anxiety, homelessness, and 
alcoholism may be indicative of domestic violence.230  
If studies can effectively analyze key dynamic factors as a means of 
predicting criminal behavior, such as domestic violence, then foundations 
such as the Arnold Foundation should incorporate these factors into Risk 
Assessment Instruments such as the PSA.231 Therefore, re-evaluation of 
the PSA every three to five years is essential to address additional concerns 
facing the community.232  
  
 
224. See id. 
225. See supra Section II.C. 
226. For a study using dynamic risk factors in an attempt to predict likelihood of 
violence, robbery, drugs and acquisitive crime, see Coid, supra note 217, at 255. 
227. See Free to Kill? NJ Bail Reform Can Leave Victims Exposed, NJ1015.COM 
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RCgXnQ. Nicole Morella of the New Jersey coalition to 
End Domestic Violence states “that the current system to determine whether a defendant 
is kept in custody does not consider several factors that are different from other violent 
criminals.” Id. 
228. Id. “[T]he court . . . [should] consider the victim’s situation after the violence 
occurs, including whether they plan on trying to get out of the relationship.” Id. 
229. See Coid, supra note 217, at 255. 
230. See id. 
231. See Myburgh et al., supra note 26, at v. 
232. See id. (“It is recommended that [Risk Assessment Instruments] be re-
evaluated every three to five years . . . [as] [r]e-validation is necessary, especially to 
ensure the quality of the instrument and the validity of the constructs.”). 
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IV.  RECOMMENDATION 
Waiting and evaluating other states’ statutes before enacting bail 
reform is not an ideal solution. Defendants across the country are sitting 
in jail because they cannot afford cash bail.233 Legislators and judiciaries 
across the country should promptly adopt the PSA and DMF.234  
Two years have passed since New Jersey enacted the CJRA.235 In that 
time, the pretrial jail population has decreased.236 Defendants charged with 
violent crimes remain in jail and indigent defendants who have committed 
less serious crimes are released.237 Further, the crime rate has dropped. 
While the PSA is not a perfect Risk Assessment Instrument, it can be re-
analyzed and adjusted to reflect changing societal standards.238 Moreover, 
the decline in prison population and decline in crime rate show that bail 
reform acts, such as the CJRA, are an effective solution to problems 
associated with cash bail.239 States across the country should follow New 
Jersey’s model. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Bail reform involving Risk Assessment Instruments is a new way of 
addressing the problem of defendants being incarcerated for the sole 
reason that they cannot afford monetary bail.240 The solution for New 
Jersey was the CJRA, which incorporated a Risk Assessment Instrument 
called the PSA.241 The PSA analyzes predetermined static factors which 
address the risks that(1) a defendant fails to appear in court; (2) a defendant 
is a danger to the community; and (3) that a defendant will obstruct the 
criminal justice process.242 The PSA scores are then applied to a DMF, 
which recommends conditions of pretrial release.243  
Critics of the CJRA have argued that the crime rate would increase 
because the same defendants would re-commit crimes while out on bail.244 
Yet two years after the CJRA’s enactment, indigent defendants in New 
Jersey have proven the critics wrong.245 The pretrial jail population has 
 
233. See Heaton, supra note 182, at 711. 
234. See supra Section II.A. 
235. See Criminal Justice Reform Report, supra note 77, at 4. 
236. See supra Sections II.C., II.D. 
237. See supra Sections III.A., III.B. 
238. See supra Section III.C. 
239. See supra Sections III.A., III.B. 
240. See supra Part I; see also supra Sections II.A., II.B. 
241. See supra Sections II.A., II.B., II.C. 
242. See supra Sections II.C.1., II.C.2., II.C.3. 
243. See supra Sections II.D. 
244. See supra Section III.B. 
245. See supra Section III.B. 
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fallen drastically along with a decrease in crime.246 Further, the CJRA has 
ensured that individuals who commit the most heinous crimes, like 
murder, cannot pay to be released from jail.247 Meanwhile, no one in the 
state of New Jersey is awaiting trial in jail for the sole reason they lack the 
financial means to leave.248 
While states such as Alaska and California have made progress in 
bail reform, other states should follow suit and use New Jersey as a 
model.249 Enacting laws like New Jersey’s CJRA in states across the 
country would ensure that individuals are assessed by their likelihood of 
appearing in court and re-offending rather than the depths of their bank 
account.250 In return for reforming their bail systems, states will not only 
see their pretrial jail population decrease substantially, but also experience 
a decline in crime overall.251  
Risk Assessment Instruments like the PSA predict future behavior 
and therefore are imperfect.252 There will inevitably be situations where 
released defendants fail to appear in court and re-commit crimes they 
otherwise would not have committed under a cash bail system.253 
Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence should underly criminal 
procedure legislation.254 By enacting the CJRA, New Jersey demonstrated 
a better way to abate the risk of violent defendants while upholding our 
country’s most critical value.255 A defendant will be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty—not indigent. 
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